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Introductory remarks: criminal wealth and confiscation orders in the 
European Union 
According to economic theory of crime, criminals are rational individuals 
engaging in a deviant behaviour in order to maximize their profits.1 The choice of 
infringing institutionalized expectations underpinning a given rule is then usually the 
outcome of a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of a certain conduct and of its 
consequences. Any attempt to combat criminal phenomena - a fortiori organized ones -2 
must therefore take into serious consideration the need for a multidisciplinary approach, 
in which public order protection has to be paired with the proper understanding of the 
sociological implications of an illegal activity and of the economic incentives to 
perform it.3 
In this context, since the last decades, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime have been identified among the most effective means of combating crime, at both 
national and international levels. Indeed, the current legal scenario is characterized by 
extremely various and fragmented national regimes, practices and experiences, to a 
certain extent influenced or completed by an increasingly vast body of international 
rules. Under this point of view, as it is well known, economic globalization has revealed 
a dark side, because it has offered to criminal organizations new lands of conquest. This 
trend has proved particularly evident in Europe, where even at the beginning of the 
twentieth century Donnedieu de Vabres warned on the fact that «il est certaine que la 
rapidité des voies de communication, la multiplicité des relations entre les peuples, 
offrent aux délinquants des chances d'impunité qu'ils ne possédaient pas autrefois. Le 
crime s'internationalise: la répression, pour être efficace doit s'internationaliser 
aussi».4 In this vein, as highlighted by some authors, the four fundamental freedoms of 
the internal market, along with the removal of controls at internal borders in the 
Schengen Area, have been gradually paving the way for a fifth one: the freedom of 
                                                          
* Research fellow at the University of Torino. 
1 See for instance E. Eide, A. Aasness, T. Skjerpen, The economics of crime: deterrence and the rational 
offender, New York: Elsevier Science 1994; more recently, I. Ehrlich, Z. Liu (eds.), The economics of 
crime, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing 2006. 
2 See on this aspect the critical analysis conducted in P. Reuter, Disorganized crime: the economics of the 
visible hand, Boston: MIT Press, 1985. The author supports the view that that mafia-type criminal 
organizations are not able to obtain total control over the major illegal markets. According to his 
argument, the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small 
enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral. 
3 The reference to the sociological implications of crime is knowingly vague from a conceptual point of 
view. Indeed, sociologists would underline the need to reverse the approach and to consider crime as a 
product of social processes which identify certain acts and persons as criminal. See S. Hester, P. Eglin, A 
sociology of crime, New York: Routledge 2004. 
4 H. Donnedieu de Vabres, Crimes et délits commis à l'étranger, Paris: Sirey 1906, p. 8. 
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movement of criminals, criminal activities and, in parallel, of judicial decisions.5 
Accordingly, as a further side effect of the European integration process, it has become 
increasingly easier for criminal enterprises to gain and reinvest profits in another 
Member State.6 
This is the reason why, during the last two decades, building on the Tampere and 
Stockholm Programmes, also at the EU level focus has been given to the identification, 
seizure and confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of criminal actions. In 
particular, in order to approach national legal orders and to strengthen judicial 
cooperation in this field, the Council adopted common rules on the seizure and 
confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime,7 as well as on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders.8  
Despite its undoubted importance, this legal framework is almost exclusively 
devoted to the minimum standards and the mechanisms for recognition and execution of 
seizure and confiscation orders.9 As a matter of fact, it addresses the core practical 
challenges to rapid and effective judicial cooperation, while very limited attention is 
paid to the disposal phase. Yet, the destination of confiscated assets can have a 
remarkable impact on the outcomes of the efforts displayed by law enforcement 
agencies, especially in cross-border situations.10 Indeed, taking into account the above 
mentioned multidisciplinary perspective, an efficient use of these former illegal gains 
can transform them into resources boosting social and economic development. 
This gap has been partially bridged by the Directive 2014/42/EU,11 which stresses 
the importance of an adequate destination of confiscated proceeds and property. What is 
more, Article 10(3) calls on Member States to consider «taking measures allowing 
confiscated assets to be used for public interest or social purposes». The express 
reference to social reuse of assets diverted from criminal activities is the result of an 
                                                          
5 See G. de Kerchove, La réconnaissance mutuelle des décisions pré-sententielles en général, in G. de 
Kerchove, A. Weyembergh (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans 
l'Union européenne, Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2001, p. 114; C. Amalfitano, 
Conflitti di giurisdizione e riconoscimento delle decisioni penali nell'Unione europea, Milano: Giuffré 
2006, p. 102. 
6 See for instance N. Gratteri, A. Nicaso, Fratelli di sangue. La n'drangheta tra arretratezza e modernità: 
da mafia agropastorale a holding del crimine, Cosenza: Luigi Pellegrini Editore 2007. At page 14 the 
authors make reference to a criminal investigation on a local group of a criminal organization which was 
able to purchase some buildings in Brussels, thereby laundering 28 millions of euro deriving from 
international drug trafficking.  
7 See the Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European 
Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L 196, 2 August 2003, p. 45-55, and the Council 
Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, 
instrumentalities and property, OJ L 68, 15 March 2005, p. 49-51. The latter replaced the Council 
Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing 
and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, OJ L 182, 5 July 2001, p. 1-2. 
8 Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 328, 24 November 2006, p. 59-78. 
9 F. Gascòn Inchausti, 'Mutual recognition and transnational confiscation orders', in F. Ruggeri (ed.), 
Transnational inquiries and the protection of fundamental rights in criminal proceedings, Heidelberg: 
Springer 2013, p. 253. 
10 B. Vettori, Tough on criminal wealth. Exploring the practice of proceeds from crime confiscation in the 
EU, Dordrecht: Springer 2007. 
11 Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing 
and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, OJ L 127, 9 April 
2014, p. 39-50. 
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intense political trilogue between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Commission and opens the way to a modern approach to the disposal phase. 
Under this point of view, the present article aims at focusing on the implications of this 
provisions for the European and the national legal orders. The first part of the analysis is 
focuses on the general ratio of social reuse of confiscated assets; the second step 
provides an overview of the existing international and European legal context on this 
specific topic. Then, the last two paragraphs concern the implications of Directive 
2014/42/EU for the national legal scenario, focusing on the main features of social reuse 
in the EU Member States. 
 
 
Social reuse of confiscated assets: ratio and purposes of an innovative 
disposal option. 
Asset recovery plays a key-role in tackling profit-oriented crimes, since 
accumulation of wealth is often the main objective of a criminal enterprise.12 What is 
more, several studies on the structure of criminal organizations have revealed that these 
profits are essential for ensuring the daily functioning, the maintenance and the 
strengthening of the organization itself.13 In fact, they enable the criminal enterprise to 
set up a sort of "shadow State", in which, for instance, affiliated members are provided 
with a well-paid job and benefit from an ad hoc social assistance and social security 
system.14 The financial capacity, then, is a source of legitimacy of the criminal 
organization and knots close ties between its members, especially in economically 
depressed and socially underdeveloped regions. 
Yet, as underlined by the so called Matrix Report, a study conducted by the 
Commission on the effectiveness of the laws and practices on the confiscation process 
in the EU Member States,15 the objective behind asset confiscation extends beyond the 
mere deprivation of criminal enterprises of their ill-gotten gains. Indeed, confiscation 
measures allow law enforcement agencies to pursue further important policy objectives, 
which a modern regulation of the disposal phase should take into due consideration. In 
this perspective, confiscation needs not to be considered solely as an ex post counter-
crime tool: instead, it is able to provide basis for a more effective prevention of serious 
crimes and of criminal organizations to take deep roots at local level. In particular, as 
                                                          
12 Some authors underline that accumulation of wealth is the true «raison d'etre» of crime: T. Kolarov, 
'Mutual recognition of judicial decisions on confiscation: the way forward', proceedings of an 
international conference on Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions and Confiscation 15 Years after 
Tampere: an Additional Tool for Depriving Criminals of their Illicit Assets all over the Union, held in 
Siracusa (Italy) on 22-23 September 2014, available at 
http://www.giustizia.it/resources/cms/documents/italia2014_ue_siracusa_kolarov.pdf (last visited on 17 
April 2015). 
13 See, in general, D.R. Cressey, Criminal organization: its elementary forms, New York: Harper & Row, 
1972. For what concerns mafia-type criminal organizations, J. Dickie, Cosa nostra: a history of the 
Sicilian mafia, New York: Palgrave MacMillian 2004. 
14 Investigations and studies on social support to organized crime have revealed that the families of active 
members of criminal organizations often benefit from financial support, in case the latter be imprisoned.  
15 Assessing the effectiveness of EU Member States’ practices in the identification, tracing, freezing and 
confiscation of criminal assets. Final Report prepared in June 2009 by Matrix Insights to the Directorate-
General Justice, Freedom & Security of the European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-




highlighted by the European Parliament in the so called Alfano Report,16 social reuse 
and the use for public interest of confiscated assets «is doubly constructive, in that it 
both helps to prevent organized crime and has the effect of boosting economic and 
social development». An effective use of these properties promotes a «positive attitude» 
to the strategies aimed at tackling crime, as it fosters a culture of legality and reinforces 
public confidence in the justice system.17 
Indeed, taking the general theory of criminal sanctions and confiscation to new 
harbors, the rationale of social reuse of confiscated assets is that serious crimes affect 
local communities and the society as a whole. Of course, specific and identifiable 
victims usually suffer a direct harm from organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking 
and several other serious offences; however, at the same time, there is a growing debate 
on the urgent need to address the damages incurred to local communities per se,18 in 
terms of lack of public security, loss of economic opportunities and blocks to social 
development.19 As a consequence, a «fair and appropriate» compensation for the 
detrimental consequences of a crime should be granted not only to its "formal" victims, 
but also to the community involved.20 As a result, under this perspective, compensation 
of victims shall also include the compensation of society that has suffered harm as a 
whole from the effects of a criminal conduct.21 This compensation can take the form of 
reusing the confiscated proceeds of aforementioned crimes for social purposes, directly 
                                                          
16 See the so called Alfano Report on organized crime in the European Union, 2010/2309(INI) of 6 
October 2011, p. 8, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2011-0333+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last visited on 15 April 2015). 
17 Literature on this topic is minimal, the only relevant recent book is L. Frigerio, D. Pati, L'uso sociale 
dei beni confiscati, 2008, which is the outcome of a study developed by the Italian Ministry of Justice and 
the anti-mafia civil society association LIBERA. The book is available at 
http://www.mafieeantimafia.it/images/download/bookformativo.pdf (last visited on 15 April 2015). 
18 In EU law, victim is usually considered a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss, directly caused by a criminal offence. This definition 
has been confirmed, with minor reforms, by Article 1(a) of the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support 
and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 
14 November 2012, p. 57-73. In the light of the second indent of the same provision, the notion of victim 
extends to the family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a criminal offence and 
who have suffered harm as a result of that person's death. The exclusion of legal persons is confirmed by 
the case-law of the European Court of Justice: see for instance ECJ, Emil Eredics and Mária Vassné Sápi, 
21 October 2010, case n. C-205/09, and ECJ, Criminal proceedings against Maurizio Giovanardi and 
others, 12 July 2012, case n. C-79/11. 
19 Social damages and the need to repair them have been recently acknowledged in a case of international 
corruption in Costa Rica. For an in-depth analysis of the case, of its imp0lications and of the debate on 
social damage see J. Olaya, K. Attisso, A. Roth, Repairing Social Damage Out of Corruption Cases: 
opportunities and challenges as illustrated in the Alcatel Case in Costa Rica, 2010, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1779834 (last visited on 15 April 2015). 
20 See Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims, OJ L 
261, 6 August 2004, p. 15-18. Pursuant to Article 12(2) of this Directive, compensation to crime victims 
has to be «fair and appropriate». 
21 On the evolving notion of victim and harm, see, also from a European perspective, I. Vanfraechem, A. 
Pemberton, F. Mukwiza Ndahinda (eds.), Justice for victims. Perspectives on rights, transition and 
reconciliation, New York: Routledge 2014. See in particular E. Ezendam and F. Wheldon's chapter 
'Recognition of victims' rights through EU action:latest developments and challenges, at p. 51. 
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involving civil society in the management of these assets and of the (cultural, 
economic,...) activities performed therein.22 
In general, the use for public interest of confiscated assets traditionally takes the 
shape of a transfer of ill-gotten profits to the public budget - either local or national - but 
social reuse may also imply direct investment of capitals or the allocation of a property 
to a civil society organization, in order to meet a specific social need. In both cases, a 
key-element is the visibility of the destination of the resources or properties at stake, in 
order to raise citizens' awareness on the fact that crime does not pay and legality can 
sort out to be an important resource for each member of the community. 
This approach to the disposal phase allows in some instances for a more active 
participation of civil society in the prevention and combating of crime, since every 
citizen is encouraged to have confidence in law enforcement authorities. Also, some 
authors underline that the transparency of the disposal mechanism facilitates the fight 
against crime, in that it deprives criminal enterprises of their breeding-ground and 
strengthens active cooperation between citizens and public authorities.23 
This positive reading of the matter shows the complex and multifaceted nature of 
confiscation measures, which often rely on a punitive character, but are - or at least can 
be - also endowed with restorative purposes. The theological patchwork is reflected by 
the wide variety of statutory schemes ruling this matter at national level, especially in 
Europe.24 Accordingly, the issue has been repeatedly raised in front of the European 
Court of Human Rights, whose well-settled case-law stresses the importance of the 
consequences of a measure on the offender and on the victim of crime in order to 
establish whether it can be considered a criminal sanction or not.25 
In case of cross-border crimes, this fragmented scenario can turn out to be a 
stumbling block to cooperation between national authorities at any stage of the 
confiscation process, including the disposal phase. Therefore, within the framework of 
universal and regional international organizations, efforts have been deployed with the 
purpose of adopting minimum rules or standards common to the contracting Parties. 
However, as we will consider more into detail in the next paragraph, despite its 
importance, the destination of confiscated assets has been largely neglected so far. 
                                                          
22 To this respect, in another context, the notion of civil society has been defined by the European 
Commission as including trade unions and employers’ organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
professional associations, charities, grass-roots organizations, organizations that involve citizens in local 
and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities. See the 
Communication from the Commission COM(2001)428 of 25 July 2001, European Governance, a White 
Paper, OJ C 287, 12 October 2001, p. 1-29. 
23 In fact, usually citizens have no possibilities to link the subsequent public/social reuse of a confiscated 
asset to its original illegal nature. Social reuse makes this link explicit: what stems from crime is openly 
given back to society, thus spreading an important cultural message that promotes the so called ‘social 
fight’ against organized crime. See the summary of RECAST Project Report n. 2, Social reuse of 
confiscated assets in the EU: current experiences and potential for their adoption by other Member States, 
available at http://flarenetwork.org/media/files/recast/recast_summary_report_2_eng.pdf (last visited on 
16 April 2015). 
24 B. Vettori, 'La confisca dei proventi criminali nel'Unione europea: analisi comparata e implicazioni di 
policy', Politica del diritto, 2002, Vol. 33, n. 2, p. 261, and, more recently, C. King, C. Walker (eds.), 
Dirty assets. Emerging issues in the regulation of criminal and terrorist assets, Farnham: Ashgate 2014. 
25 The European Court of Human Rights applies the so called Engel criteria in order to formally qualify 
confiscation measures. See ECHR, Engel and others v. The Netherlands, 8 June 1976, application n. 
5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/71 and 5370/71; ECHR, Welch v. United Kingdom, 9 February 1995, 





Social reuse of confiscated assets: the international and European legal 
framework. 
A number of international treaties and conventions include provisions on the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime and seek to promote international cooperation in 
this field. These instruments usually do not adopt a comprehensive approach to the 
subject, since they consider the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of 
illegally gained assets with regard to specific offences. Important examples are 
represented by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption,26 on the example of which the 
existing body of international legal instruments has been built.  
On the one hand, the Transnational Organized Crime Convention binds State 
parties to cooperate «to the greatest extent possible» in response to requests for 
execution of confiscation issued by the authorities of another State.27 Besides this 
general obligation to cooperate, Article 14 addresses the disposal of the proceeds of 
crime or property, which should be conducted in accordance with the law of the 
executing State. For the purposes of the present analysis, under Article 14(2), States 
Parties are asked to give priority consideration to returning the confiscated assets to the 
requesting State Party, to the extent permitted by domestic law and if so requested. This 
option is aimed to award compensation to the victims of crime or to return the proceeds 
or property to the legitimate owner. 
On the other hand, the Convention against Corruption has been described as a 
«new dawn»,28 thanks to its innovative and far-reaching provisions on asset recovery, 
whose purpose is to ensure the effective respect of the duty to recognize and enforce 
foreign confiscation orders. As to the destination of confiscated assets, Article 57 
attaches priority to the return of confiscated assets to the requesting State or to the prior 
legitimate owners. This provision is particularly important, since the phenomenon of 
international corruption often involves developing "victim" countries, where the 
detrimental effects of high-level corruption are sadly evident.29 Moreover, the return to 
the requesting State is a priority in case of embezzlement and subsequent laundering of 
public funds, since the national community per se is directly affected by the criminal 
conduct. 
A similar provision can be found in the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism, whose Article 25(2) states that the requested State can «give 
priority consideration to returning the confiscated property to the requesting Party so 
                                                          
26 See respectively the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, entered into force on 29 September 2003, and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 31 
October 2003, entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
27 See Article 13 of the Convention. 
28 A. Bacarese, 'Advancing international understanding and cooperation in combating fraud and 
corruption: recovering stolen assets - a new issue?, ERA Forum, 2009, vol. 10, at p. 423. 
29 On this subject see L. Cockcroft, Global corruption. Money, power and ethics in the modern world, 
Philadelphia: University of Pensylvenia Press 2012. 
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that it can give compensation to the victims».30 Nonetheless, the Convention does not 
refer to the return to the requesting State per se, for compensation to the communities 
affected by the crime and therefore leaves no space for social reuse considerations. 
For what concerns the EU, the problem of the destination of confiscated proceeds 
has been a matter of concern over the past years in several policy documents. For 
instance, in a 2008 communication on the proceeds of organized crime, the Commission 
acknowledged the existence of different practices in the Member States with regard to 
the use of recovered assets.31 In this perspective, the Commission stressed the need to 
promote and spread the experiences which had proven to be effective at national level, 
including some forms of social reuse taken from the Italian context, where - as we will 
consider more into detail in the next steps of the analysis - assets can be entrusted to 
local public authorities, non-governmental organizations and associations for social 
uses. Accordingly, the matter under consideration was formally enshrined in the policy 
agenda of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice by the Stockholm Programme of 
2009,32 where the European Council called upon the Commission and the Member 
States to plan new rules allowing a more effective identification of assets of criminals 
and to «consider reusing them wherever they are found in the EU common space».33 In 
2011, a similar concern was expressed by the European Parliament, which urged the 
Commission «to accept and support the urgent need for European legislation on the 
reuse of crime proceeds for social purposes»,34 in order to re-inject into legal economic 
circuits the resources of criminal organizations and their associates.35 
Responding to these pressures, the Commission launched a proposal for a new 
Directive on the freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, which, as 
mentioned before, was eventually adopted in April 2014.36 The Commission 
Communication made very limited and indirect reference to the destination of assets for 
public interest. As a matter of fact, it merely provided for the duty to collect data on the 
                                                          
30 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, CETS n. 198, opened for signature in Warsaw on 16 May 2005 
and entered into force after six ratifications on 1 May 2008. 
31 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council COM(2008)766 
final, of 20 November 2008 – Proceeds of organized crime: ensuring that “crime does not pay”, not 
published in the OJ. 
32 European Council, The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens, OJ C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 1-38. 
33 Instead, the Hague Programme of 2004 only made a few references to the need for cooperation between 
law enforcement authorities and civil society. European Council, The Hague Programme - Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice In The European Union, OJ C 53, 3 March 2005, p. 1. 
34 European Parliament, Report on organized crime in the European Union, 6 October 2001, 
(2010/2309(INI)). The Parliament pointed out that at the EU level only limited attention has been given to 
the final destination of confiscated assets and that within Member States using confiscated assets for 
social purposes is not a widely established practice. It also analyzed the advantages of the social re-use of 
confiscated assets and came to the conclusion that there was a clear need for a coherent European 
approach. A similar position was expressed by the Council: Justice and Home Affairs Council, 
Conclusions on confiscation and asset recovery of 4 June 2010. 
35 Two years before, on 7 May 2009, the European Parliament had adopted Resolution to the Council on 
the development of an EU criminal justice area, (2009/2012(INI)). The Parliament urged the adoption 
«without delay» of a legislative instrument «on confiscation of the financial assets and property of 
international criminal organizations and on their re-use for social purposes». 
36 See the Commission Communication COM(2012)85 final of 12 March 2012, Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the 
European Union, not published in OJ. 
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value of the property destined to reuse for law enforcement, prevention or social 
purposes, on a yearly basis, in order to allow the Commission to review the 
effectiveness of national confiscation systems.37 Therefore, the Commission's proposal 
presupposed the existence of national laws and practices on the matter, but failed to put 
forward standards common to the Member States.38 The increased vulnerabilities caused 
by the economic crisis and the subsequent new challenges for public authorities to 
finance growing needs for social services and assistance led the Commission to stress 
the - symbolic and practical - importance of the destination of confiscated assets. 
However, no provisions expressly considered this topic, so that it would have been for 
each Member State to decide whether to opt for such a disposal regime or not. In this 
vein, despite the appeals made by some non-governmental organizations and the strong 
criticism raised by the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions,39 the text of the proposal was only partially amended by the Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs Standing Committee of the European Parliament. In fact, the 
Parliament - whose position was eventually approved by the Council at the end of the 
first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure - had to face fierce oppositions to the 
imposition upon member States of a strict obligation to introduce compulsory forms of 
social reuse of confiscated assets in their legal orders.40 The need to find a political 
compromise led to the current wording of Article 10(3) of the Directive 2014/42/EU, 
pursuant to which «Member States shall consider taking measures allowing confiscated 
property to be used for public interest or social purposes».41 
 
                                                          
37 It is interesting to underline that this provision has been eventually amended by the European 
Parliament and the Council, which have deleted any reference to the collection of data on reused assets. 
Pursuant to Article 11(1)(d) of the 2014/42/EU Directive, the Member States shall regularly collect and 
maintain comprehensive statistics on «the estimated value of property recovered at the time of 
confiscation». 
38 See also the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
COM(2010)673 of 22 November 2010, regarding the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps 
towards a more secure Europe, adopted by the European Council on 25-26 March 2010. The Internal 
Security Strategy of the EU identified serious and organized crime, trafficking in drugs and persons, and 
corruption, among others, as the main crime-related risks and threats which Europe has to face. The 
document focused on the need to exploit the synergies among law enforcement agencies; however, it did 
not exploit the potential synergies between public actors and the private sector and did not include any 
mention of the social re-use of confiscated assets. 
39 See for instance the opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the EU Internal Security Strategy, OJ 
C 259, 2 September 2011, p. 70-75. The Committee recommended that a legislative proposal should 
specify, «the municipality in which the confiscated property is located as the natural recipient of the right 
of ownership thereof. […]The Committee recommends that this should be done for a socially useful 
purpose, such as giving it to charities and cooperatives, not least because local communities bear the 
highest cost of the activities of organized criminals and the social re-use of confiscated property has a 
high value in terms of compensating communities affected by this serious issue». 
40 On the dialogue between the European Parliament and the Council during the legislative procedure see 
F. Mazzacuva, 'La posizione della Commissione LIBE del Parlamento europeo alla proposta di direttiva 
relativa al congelamento e alla confisca dei proventi di reato', ww.penalecontemporaneo.it, available at 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/area/3-/17-/-/2424-
la_posizione_della_commissione_libe_del_parlamento_europeo_alla_proposta_di_direttiva_relativa_al_c
ongelamento_e_alla_confisca_dei_proventi_di_reato/ (last visited on 15 April 2014).  
41 This provision is not a good example of the «sober and precise legal wording» the first EC legal 
instruments have been praised of: P. Pescatore, 'Some critical remarks on the Single European Act', 




Directive 2014/42/EU and social reuse of confiscated assets: nature and 
implications of Article 10(3). 
Some commentators have argued that this provision does not impose any 
obligation on the Member States, since national authorities are not asked to put in place 
specific forms of social reuse of assets.42 Also, the notions of social reuse and public 
interest have been considered too vague to give rise to a duty of implementation at 
national level, whose timely and correct respect the Commission could hardly verify. 
Nonetheless, there appears to be sufficient ground to support a different view. 
According to the well-settled general theory of the EU sources of law,43 the provisions 
of secondary law cannot be deprived of any practical effect or rendered redundant. 
Instead, their effet utile should be maximized, to the extent that the full effectiveness of 
EU law is a cornerstone principle of the European legal order and of its relationship 
with national law.44 This peculiar approach is confirmed by the criteria commonly used 
for interpreting EU law: a literal interpretation of the text of the Directive as well as a 
theological reading of its meaning highlight that Article 10(3) entails a procedural 
obligation for Member States, whose content changes depending on the national legal 
background. For instance, the States which do not recognize any form of social reuse 
are under the duty to conduct - and to communicate to the Commission - an in-depth 
analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of introducing such measures; other States 
could simply consider the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of their disposal 
regime or to adopt foreign best practices in their legal orders.45 In any case, every 
Member State will be asked to communicate to the Commission the initiatives 
conducted with the purpose of implementing Article 10(3) of the Directive, otherwise 
the "guardian of the Treaties" will be entitled to initiate an infringement procedure in 
the light of Article 258 TFEU.46 
Besides the possible consequences of a failure to comply with the procedural 
obligation described, the importance of Article 10(3) should not be underestimated also 
due to its highly innovative character and its potential field of application. On the one 
hand, Article 10(3) is the sole provision in EU secondary law addressing this matter 
comprehensively. More precisely, only one - partially similar and extremely specific - 
precedent can be identified in Regulation 995/2010 on the obligation of the operators 
                                                          
42 See A.M. Maugeri, 'La direttiva 2014/42/UErelativa alla confisca degli strumenti e dei proventi da 
reato nell'Unione europea tra garanzie ed efficienza: un work in progress', www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 
available at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/tipologia/4-/-/-/3287-
la_direttiva_2014_42_ue_relativa_alla_confisca_degli_strumenti_e_dei_proventi_da_reato_nell_unione_
europea_tra_garanzie_ed_efficienza__un___work_in_progress_/ (last visited on 15 April 2015). 
43 See for instance S. Prechal, Directives in EC law, Oxford: OUP 2005. 
44 See, for instance, ECJ, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, 26 February 2013, case n. C-399/11. 
45 The original text of the Commission's proposal lent indirect confirmation of these aspects. As already 
mentioned, Article 11 called upon Member States to collect and maintain comprehensive statistics, in 
order pave the way for a scrutiny of the effectiveness of the national confiscation system. Among the 
various elements, the proposal also listed «the value of the property destined to be reused for law 
enforcement, prevention or social purposes». 
46 In particular, in the light of Article 260(3) TFEU, when the Commission brings a case before the Court 
pursuant to Article 258 on the grounds that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfill its obligation 
to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure, it may directly specify 
the amount of the lump sum or penalty to be paid by the Member State. Therefore, the lump sum and/or 
the penalty payment can be imposed by the Court even at the end of the first infringement procedure. 
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who place timbers and timber products on the market47. In case of infringements of the 
provisions of the Regulation, Article 19 calls upon every Member State to take 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, aiming to «effectively deprive those 
responsible of the economic benefits» illegally obtained. Under this point of view, 
recital no. 27 specifies that the penalty formally implies the destruction of illegally 
harvested timber, however «such timber or timber products should not necessarily be 
destroyed, but may instead be used or disposed of for public interest purposes». 
On the other hand, the scope of application of the Directive 2014/42/EU extends 
to all the serious crimes with a cross-border dimension listed in Article 83(1) TFEU.48 
Therefore, unlike previous international instruments, the Directive does not apply to a 
specific offence, but involves the core of the criminal competence of the EU.49 To this 
regard, the last sentence of Article 3 introduces an open clause allowing for further 
extension of the field of application of the common rules on confiscation, in case other 
EU instruments provide specifically that the Directive applies to the criminal offences 
harmonized therein.50 
What is more, the scope of application of the Directive - and subsequently the 
potential practical implications of Article 10(3) - is further expanded by an innovative 
approach to the targets of confiscation orders. As a matter of fact, in line with the 
previous European acts on the subject, the Directive refers to the instrumentalities of 
crime, to the proceeds and to property, but expressly supports a wider notion of such 
crime-related assets. In particular, under Article 2(a) of the Framework Decision 
2005/212/JHA, the proceeds of crime were described as any economic advantage 
stemming from criminal offences, consisting of any form of property.51 This vague 
definition constituted the breeding-ground for conflicting interpretations at national 
level, since some Member States limited the scope of application of the national 
implementation measures only to economic advantages directly referred to a crime, 
thereby excluding indirect proceeds and subsequent reinvestments or transformations of 
                                                          
47 Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the Council and the European Parliament of 20 October 2010, laying 
down the obligations of operators who place timbers and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12 
November 2010, p. 23-34. 
48 Article 3 of the Directive provides for a clear list of the crimes involved and of the EU legal 
instruments currently covering such crimes. The provisions of Article 3 must therefore be considered 
dynamic references, capable of evolving in case of reform or replacement of the Directives or Framework 
Decisions expressly mentioned there. 
49 Moreover, Article 14 clarifies that the Directive replaces Joint Action 98/699/JHA, Article 1(a) and 
Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, and the first four indents of Article 1 and Article 
3 of Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA. Therefore, as to the latter Framework Decision, Articles 2, 4 
and 5 remain into force for criminal activities which fall outside the scope of the Directive 2014/42/EU. 
As a matter of fact, the Framework Decision under consideration applies to all criminal offences 
punishable at national level by deprivation of liberty for at least one year. 
50 The Directive does not specify whether such acts have to take the shape of Directives or Regulations. In 
any case, they have to harmonize a certain crime. The open clause under consideration has not been 
applied after the entry into force of the new rules on confiscation: Directive 2014/57/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse 
directive), based on Article 83(2) TFEU makes no reference to confiscation. 
51 This definition stems from Article 1(a) of the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Accordingly, Article 3 of the Framework 
Decision 2001/500/JHA stated that the words "proceeds and "property", for the purposes of that Third 
Pillar act, had to be defined and interpreted in accordance with the text of the 1990 Convention of the 
Council of Europe.  
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such benefits. Article 3(a) of the Directive meets the need for a clearer "European 
guidance" on this topic and extends the definition of proceed to any advantage which 
«derives directly or indirectly from a criminal offence, including any form of property 
and any subsequent reinvestment or transformation of direct proceeds and any valuable 
benefits».52 Then, the scope of application of the Directive has been remarkably 
expanded, since the notion of proceeds involves any property which has been 
transformed or converted, fully or in part, into other property, and that which has been 
intermingled with assets acquired from legitimate sources, up to the assessed value of 
the intermingled proceeds.53 The broad definition also includes the income or other 
benefits derived from the sale, transformation or conversion of the proceeds of crime. 
Accordingly, the Directive provides for a broad definition of "property", which is to a 
large extent similar to the wording of Article 1, second indent, of the Framework 
Decision 2005/212/JHA.54 Indeed, the notion includes «property of any description, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or 
instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property».55 
Since the Directive does not replace in toto the previously existing EU provisions 
on confiscation, concerns were raised with regard to the risk of inconsistencies between 
different notions of proceeds and property. In fact, some provisions of the Framework 
Decisions 2001/500/JHA and 2005/212/JHA are still in force, due to the fact that their 
field of application does not match perfectly with the definitions of the new Directive.56 
Interestingly, on the basis of a proposal put forward by the European Parliament, the 
potential gaps have been bridged by extending the new wide notion of proceeds and 
property to criminal offences not covered by the Directive. Therefore, always bearing in 
mind the urgent need to respect the principle of legality, the Member States are asked to 
uphold a uniform and coherent meaning of the notions at stake.57 
                                                          
52 In this regard, the wording of the Directive partially shares the broad definition of proceeds provided 
for in other international instruments, such as the UNTOC and UNCAC Conventions, mentioned above. 
For instance, in the light of Article 2(e) of the former, «proceeds of crime shall mean any property 
derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence». 
53 The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Standing Committee of the European Parliament wanted 
to include goods held jointly with the spouse. This proposal of amendment was intended to avoid the 
frequent and crafty use to transfer the goods fictitiously to the spouse just in view of subtracting property 
from any Court orders. However, the proposal was not endorsed by the Council. On the contrary, the 
European Bar Association had urged the Commission and the European legislators to limit the definition 
of proceeds to the advantages directly deriving from the crime. 
54 As to the concept of instrumentalities, the definition has not changed over the time: since the 
Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, they have been described as «any property used or intended to be 
used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences». See Article 
2(3) of the Directive 2014/42/EU. The same definition can be found at Article 1(c) of the CoE 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 
Financing of Terrorism. 
55 However, the notion is more precisely explained in recital no. 12 of the Directive, in the light of which 
such documents or instruments can include, for example, financial instruments, or documents that may 
give rise to creditor claims and are normally found in the possession of the person affected by the relevant 
procedures. 
56 G. Arcifa, The new EU Directive on confiscation: a good (even if still prudent) starting point for the 
post-Lisbon EU strategy on tracking and confiscating illicit money, University of Catania working paper 
n. 64/2014, available at http://www.cde.unict.it/sites/default/files/Quaderno%20europeo_64_2014.pdf 
(last visited on 16 April 2015). 
57 Another important element capable of indirectly enhancing the impact of Article 10(3) of the Directive 
regards the various forms of confiscation introduced by the Directive itself. As a matter of fact, the 
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The potential practical consequences of Article 10(3) also depend on the 
application of other EU provisions on the disposal of confiscated assets. As already 
underlined, this aspect of the confiscation process has been largely neglected by the EU 
institutions so far. The only provision on the subject - which Article 10(3) must be read 
along with - is Article 16 of the Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA, that sets out some 
general criteria on the relationship between authorities of different Member States as to 
the use or destination of confiscated assets. Pursuant to Article 16(4), the foremost 
criterion ruling the disposal phase is the “freedom of negotiation” between the Member 
States involved: any agreement concluded by the national authorities – whether 
preceding or following the confiscation order – prevails over the other criteria set out by 
the Framework Decision. As a consequence, some authors have pointed out that this 
provision is almost detrimental to the search for minimum common standards binding 
the Member States: the Framework Decision under consideration would not even 
establish mandatory minimum standards, but instead merely dispositive provisions, 
which the Member States would be free to deviate from.58 
In all other cases, the disposal regime and the role of the authorities of the 
requesting and executing Member States depend on the nature of confiscated proceeds 
or property. Article 16(1) rules the powers of the executing State as regards money 
which has been obtained from the execution of a confiscation order. If the amount is 
below 10,000 Euro, the sum shall accrue to the executing State itself; if that threshold is 
overcome, 50% of the amount has to be transferred to the issuing State.59 The following 
paragraph entitles the authorities of the executing State to decide the destination of 
property other than money. In particular, the asset can be sold, transferred to the issuing 
State or, on a residual basis, disposed of in another way according to the law of the 
executing State. Henceforth, executing Member States benefit from an evident incentive 
to resort to sale as a disposal option for movable or immovable goods, due to the 
possibility to withhold 50% of the amount. In order to strengthen the tendency to resort 
to social reuse, the transfer of property under Article 16(2) would be highly desirable; 
however, it is does not constitute a must-do option, rather an opportunity that compels 
the State to bear the financial burdens of the execution of the confiscation order, without 
receiving any direct benefits. 
Therefore, Article 10(3), read in conjunction with Article 16 of the Framework 
Decision 2006/783/JHA, marks a step forward in spreading a positive attitude to 
cooperation procedures in the field of confiscation orders. The social reuse of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
European Parliament and the Council managed to find a delicate political compromise on a new regime 
on third party confiscation, extended powers of confiscation and non-conviction based confiscation. 
These forms of confiscation strengthen the powers of law enforcement authorities in this field to a 
significant extent and increase the chances to deprive criminals and criminal enterprises of their assets. 
The relevant provisions - namely Articles 4(2), 5 and 6 of the Directive - would deserve an in-depth 
analysis and have been attentively commented by many authors so far. For the purposes of the present 
article, however, they are of minor importance, since they only influence indirectly and potentially the 
practical implications of social reuse of confiscated assets. For a specific study of these aspects see, from 
both European and national perspectives, see G. Arcifa, The new EU Directive on confiscation, op. cit. 
58 T. Kolarov, 'Mutual recognition of judicial decisions on confiscation', op. cit. 
59 This approach is quite similar to the 1990 Convention and the UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, where the disposal of confiscated property is left to the 
domestic law of requested States, unless the State agrees otherwise. See R. Golobinek, Financial 
investigations and confiscation of proceeds from crime, Council of Europe Training Manual for Law 
Enforcement and Judiciary, 2006. 
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confiscated assets represents one of the disposal options available to the Member States, 
nonetheless clearer policy choices should be taken in order to offer appropriate 
incentives to the executing State, taking into account its role in the disposal phase. 
 
 
Social reuse of confiscated assets in national laws and practices: between 
traditional and innovative disposal options. 
The destination of confiscated assets for social reuse is an existing option in the 
legislation of the majority of the EU Member States. However, it is not easy to extract 
from the Member States examples for a common definition for "reuse for social 
purpose", since very different and to a certain extent diverging solutions and practices 
are being experienced at national level. As already underlined, regulations concerning 
confiscation measures vary widely from country to country, despite the adoption of 
common minimum standards at European level: the disposal phase does not constitute 
an exception, also due to the difficulty to approach or better coordinate diverging 
interpretations of new and always evolving concepts, such as the notions social reuse or 
social purposes. 
The national laws and practices on social reuse of confiscated assets have been 
analyzed in-depth in a recent study developed within the framework of the RECAST 
Project (REuse of Confiscated Assets for Social Purposes: towards common EU 
standards), financed by the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, under the ISEC 
Programme. The final reports of the project was drafted by the Department of European 
Studies and International Integration of the University of Palermo and Flare Network, 
under the auspices of UNICRI and with the support of the Italian Agenzia Nazionale per 
l'Amministrazione e la Destinazione dei Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati alla Criminalità 
Organizzata.60 The key-finding of this report is that the main disposal options, in the 
vast majority of the Member States, are sale or use by public authorities. This situation 
is mainly due to the fact that the disposal phase is usually instrumental for ensuring 
compensation to the victims of crime and for either covering judicial costs or sustaining 
public budgets in general.61 
At the same time, however, many national legal orders provide for various forms 
of reuse, which are usually qualified as a last resort or a residual solution. These options 
can be divided into two main categories, namely indirect and direct forms of social 
reuse. The measures of the former group are the most common and usually involve 
public authorities, called upon to invest the proceeds in funds and projects focused, for 
instance, on crime prevention and support to victims. In order foster indirect social 
reuse, many Member States have extended the range of potential beneficiaries or the 
scope of traditional transfers of property, thereby allowing for reuse of certain type of 
assets for the public interest or charitable purposes. In these cases, transfer of property 
for social purposes is mainstreamed within the general legislation on disposal of 
confiscated assets and is usually applied as second option to ordinary public sale. As a 
                                                          
60 The final reports and all other information on the project are available at 
http://flarenetwork.org/fight/recast (last visited on 15 April 2015). 
61 See also B. Vettori, T. Kolarov, Disposal of confiscated assets in the EU Member States Laws and 
practices, Working paper of the Centre for the Study of Democracy of the University of Palermo, 
available at http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17103 (last visited on 16 April 2015). Destruction of 
confiscated goods is a widespread option too, although it applies only under strict conditions. For 
instance, unusable, irretrievably depreciated or illegal items are usually destined to this disposal option. 
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consequence, despite their positive social impact, these forms of social reuse do not 
entail an active involvement of civil society, which is a mere beneficiary of such 
measures. Moreover, assets are often treated as public resources or mixed up with 
public funds, so that their true origin is disguised and citizens are prevented from fully 
identify and appreciate the transformation of former illegal gains into resources used for 
the benefit of the whole community.  
Instead, the latter category includes more innovative approaches to social reuse, 
which to various degrees imply a direct and pro-active involvement of civil society 
organizations. In this context, only a handful of Member States have adopted a 
comprehensive set of rules on the matter, even establishing central specialized agencies 
responsible for the management of the overall process of allocation of the confiscated 
assets. One of the best examples is Italy, which over the years has developed a 
remarkable expertise on this matter, also due to the deeply rooted presence of mafia-
type criminal organizations in its territory. The Italian antimafia code, within the 
framework of an extremely detailed regulation of the disposal phase, among the various 
available options, provides for the opportunity to rent companies to worker 
cooperatives, in case their business is likely to continue, and to allocate real estate to 
local entities, for institutional purposes or social reuse. In this case, assets can be 
transferred, for instance, to the municipality where they are locate and it is for the public 
entity to manage the property or to transfer it to civil society organizations, on the basis 
of the collective needs of the community involved. A similar approach can be found in 
Hungary, where Act XII of 2000 allows for the allocation of confiscated assets to 
NGOs, taking into account the indications of a Council for Charity, which selects the 
potential beneficiaries. However, the same Act limits the resort to this form of disposal 
to a list of movable goods, such as food, clothing, telecommunication equipment, toys, 
while lands and real estate are excluded. 
In Luxembourg, a law dating back to 1992 introduced social reuse of proceeds 
from drug trafficking and money laundering and established the Fonds de lutte contre le 
trafic de stupéfiants. In 2010, the scope of intervention of the fund - now renamed 
Fonds de lutte contre certaines formes de criminalité - was extended, in order to support 
initiatives against several other serious crimes. The specific focus on drug trafficking 
also characterizes the French legal order, since decree no. 322 of 17 March 1995 
established a fund to reinvest the proceeds of confiscated assets in connection with this 
crime, under the supervision of a centralized body, the Mission interministerielle de 
lutte contre la drogue et la toxicomanie. 
 
 
Concluding remarks: a long road ahead? 
The experiences reported show that the Member States and the EU have still a 
long way to go to reach the objective of the maximization of the value of confiscated 
assets. A value which is not only material or economic, but also social and symbolic, 
since an effective and transparent reuse of those assets for public interest is able to 
foster the culture of legality and to raise the citizens' confidence on the law enforcement 
system. Despite the gradually increasing attention of both the European institutions and 
the national authorities to the opportunities offered by social reuse of confiscated assets, 
this disposal option still remains underexploited.  
At the EU level, in all probability, the entry into force of Directive 2014/42/EU 
will not change the current scenario, since the Member States are not bound by the 
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obligation to implement common Union standards on this matter. Instead, they are just 
called upon to consider the opportunity of introducing this disposal option in their legal 
order, without additional guidance on the key-elements which social reuse of 
confiscated assets should respect and be based on. Moreover, the rules on the 
confiscation process lay at the core of national criminal systems, which often diverge 
sharply on this matter. As a consequence, many provisions of the Directive - and Article 
10(3) is a perfect example - are worded vaguely and leave significant discretionary 
power to the Member States as to their implementation. In this perspective, nonetheless, 
it is worth remembering that the Member States have traditionally failed to correctly 
and timely implement the Framework Decisions adopted in the field of seizure and 
confiscation. Several reports issued by the Commission on the state of the art at national 
level confirm that the vast majority of the States have to a large extent infringed their 
obligation to transpose the EU minimum rules in their legal orders. After the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission is entitled to initiate infringement 
procedures against the Member States also with regard to judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, however this structural tendency highlights that the Member States are 
willing to maintain and protect the peculiarities of their confiscation schemes. For the 
same reason, Denmark and the United Kingdom are not taking part in the Directive and 
therefore are not bound by its provisions, pursuant to the opt-out regime they benefit 
from in the light of Protocols n. 21 and 22.62 
Also, the impact of Article 10(3) of the Directive under consideration could be 
hindered by the peculiar functioning of the mechanisms of judicial cooperation in the 
disposal phase introduced by the Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA for cross-border 
situations.63 In fact, Article 16 of the Framework Decision, analyzed above, assigns a 
central role to the State of execution of the confiscation order, while usually the rules on 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters impose to the receiving State the obligation to 
recognize and execute the foreign judicial decision swiftly and without any additional 
formality. The rules on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to criminal 
judicial decisions pursue the objective of strengthening cooperation between national 
authorities, so that the "master" of the mechanism is the issuing State and the receiving 
one is under the primary duty to "recognize and execute". The wide discretionary and 
operational power of the executing authority could then discourage mutual trust 
between the authorities involved. 
As to the national level, judicial and law enforcement authorities have to face 
several operational challenges, which might hamper the functioning and the 
effectiveness of the disposal phase. Some of them derive from the material 
characteristics of the assets, such as their bad conditions or rapid deterioration, the 
presence of mortgage liens or other third party claims.64 Others depend on legislative or 
                                                          
62 This is quite surprising, since Denmark had taken the initiative for the adoption of Framework Decision 
2005/212/JHA. 
63 It is important to point out, however, that the Directive does apply also to purely national situations, in 
case the crime the confiscation order stems from falls under the scope of application of the Directive 
itself. 
64 See J-P. Brun, L. Gray, C. Scott, K.M. Stephenson, Asset recovery handbook. A guide for practitioners, 
Washington: The World Bank 2011. The authors refer to common types of assets and associated 
problems. This is important, as not every type of assets can be re-used for specific purposes. Aside from 
money in its various forms and to some extent properties, other forms of assets such as businesses, 
livestock and farms, and precious metals, jewels and artwork are very difficult to manage and to sell. 
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institutional gaps and range from the general attitude of the authorities involved to the 
lack of adequate cooperation between the various actors of the disposal process, a 
fortiori in cross-border situations. In response to these challenges, a specialized 
approach to the disposal phase would be necessary, especially as far as social reuse 
options are concerned. 
 
 
